Hezbollah device explosions: The unanswered questions

In a shocking turn of events, a series of explosions involving pagers and radio devices occurred in Lebanon, resulting in numerous injuries and at least 37 fatalities. The incidents have raised many questions about how such a devastating operation was executed. Hezbollah, the group affected by these explosions, has pointed fingers at Israel, although Israel has yet to respond to these allegations. The BBC has traced the origins of these devices through several countries, including Taiwan, Japan, Hungary, and Israel, and is now piecing together the details surrounding this troubling event. One of the primary questions that experts are grappling with is how the pagers were compromised. Initial theories suggested that a sophisticated hacking operation might have been responsible for the explosions. However, experts quickly dismissed this idea, indicating that the scale of destruction suggests the devices were likely rigged with explosives before they came into Hezbollah's possession. Photographs of the damaged pagers reveal a logo from a Taiwanese electronics manufacturer named Gold Apollo. The founder of this company, Hsu Ching-Kuang, expressed disbelief when approached by reporters, asserting that his company had no involvement in the production of these devices. He pointed to a Hungarian firm called BAC Consulting, explaining that three years prior, he had licensed his trademark to them, allowing them to use the Gold Apollo name on their own products. Hsu also mentioned that the financial transactions with BAC had been unusual, with payments originating from the Middle East, raising further questions about the legitimacy of the company. The BBC attempted to investigate BAC Consulting, visiting their registered office in Budapest, only to find that the address was shared with multiple other companies, and no one could provide any information about BAC. Hungarian officials described BAC as a trading intermediary with no manufacturing capabilities in the country. A brochure published by BAC on LinkedIn claimed partnerships with various organizations, including the UK Department for International Development (DfID). However, the UK Foreign Office, which has taken over DfID's responsibilities, stated that they were looking into the matter and had no involvement with BAC. The individual listed as BAC's CEO, Cristiana Bársony-Arcidiacono, reportedly stated in an interview that she was merely an intermediary and did not produce the pagers. This has led to speculation that BAC Consulting may be a front for Israeli intelligence operations. While the BBC has not been able to verify these claims, Bulgarian authorities have begun investigating another company linked to BAC, uncovering financial transactions amounting to 1. 6 million euros that were connected to the device attacks in Lebanon. Another pressing question is how the radio devices, which exploded in a subsequent wave of attacks, were compromised. Some of these devices were identified as the IC-V82 model manufactured by the Japanese company ICOM. Reports indicate that Hezbollah purchased these radios five months ago. A sales representative from ICOM stated that the exploded devices appeared to be counterfeit, as the company had ceased production of this model nearly a decade ago. ICOM emphasized that all their products are manufactured in Japan and do not outsource production. An ICOM director suggested that the damage observed around the battery compartments of the exploded radios indicated they may have been modified to include explosives. The method of detonation for these devices remains unclear. Videos captured during the incidents show victims reaching into their pockets just moments before the explosions occurred, leading to chaos in the streets and homes across Lebanon. Lebanese authorities have concluded that the devices were detonated by electronic messages sent to them. Reports indicate that the pagers received messages that appeared to originate from Hezbollah's leadership, which triggered the explosions. However, the exact nature of the messages sent to the radio devices is still unknown. The fear of further sabotage has gripped the people of Lebanon, with many questioning whether other devices, such as cameras, phones, or laptops, could also be rigged with explosives. The Lebanese Army has been deployed in Beirut, utilizing remote-controlled bomb disposal robots to conduct controlled explosions of suspicious devices. Journalists in Lebanon have been instructed to refrain from using their phones or cameras due to safety concerns. One woman expressed the widespread anxiety, stating, 'Everyone is just panicking… We don’t know if we can stay next to our laptops, our phones. Everything seems like a danger at this point. ' The timing of the attacks has also sparked speculation. Some believe that Israel aimed to send a powerful message to Hezbollah following a year of escalating tensions, particularly after Hezbollah launched rockets at northern Israel shortly after the Hamas attack on October 7. Others suggest that Israel may not have intended to execute their plan at this moment but felt compelled to act quickly due to fears that their plot was about to be uncovered. According to reports, the initial strategy was for the pager attack to serve as the opening move in a larger conflict aimed at crippling Hezbollah's capabilities. However, it appears that Israel opted to carry out the attack sooner than originally planned.